认知的具身化（Embodiment）(4)
作者：佚名； 更新时间：2014-12-05
学习行走必须解决重心稳定问题，学习够取物体必须保持手臂的稳定性。这就是说，不是神经系统对肌肉的控制导致动作的发展，而是动作活动提出的生物力学问题要求神经系统借助于不断的练习和反馈，实现对肌肉的有效控制。动作活动提出的生物力学问题不同，那么神经系统对肌肉的控制必定不同。[31]
4 结语
这些研究表明，认知并不单是在脑神经系统中的表征的操作；确切地说，认知最初是在活的身体的界面上进行的，只是到了认知发展的高级阶段，特别是到了符号语义的阶段，认知的内在表征方面才高度发展并成为认知活动的重要领域。在这个阶段，有赖于符号语义特性，认知不再局限于实时的（real-time）的环境，人脑的高度发展的神经系统为离线（off-line）认知准备了一个内在的、想像力的空间，认知者不再非要处于实时的环境中和实际的对象交往，于是在某种程度上，认知成了处理心理表征的过程。这也正是认知主义所聚焦的阶段，但认知主义过于孤立地看待这个阶段而无视它的发展和起源。
具身认知作为一个范式必然有其最初的观念上的变革，它有许多重要的思想先驱，目前逼近它的研究方法更是涉及众多领域。一个对认知更为全景的轮廓正在逐渐形成。
参考文献：
[1] Clark, A. An embodied cognitive science？(1999). Trends in Cognitive Sciences Volume：3, Issue：9, September 1, 345-351.
[2] 莱考夫在和布鲁克曼（John Brockman）的谈话（"Philosophy In The Flesh"：A Talk With George Lakoff）中再直白不过地认为：我们是神经存在，我们的大脑从我们身体其余部份接受它们的输入。我们的身体像什么以及它们如何在世界中发挥作用塑造了我们用以思考的恰当的概念。我们根本无法思考任何东西——除了我们的具身大脑（embodied brains）允许的那些东西。
[3] Ziemke, T. (2001). Disentangling Notions of Embodiment[J]. Workshop on Developmental Embodied Cognition, Edinburgh, UK, July 2001.
[4] The MIT encyclopedia of the cognitive sciences[M] /edited by Robert A. Wilson and Frank C. Keil. (1999). London : MIT Press. 244.
[5] Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience[M]. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 9.
[6] Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience[M]. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 172–173.
[7] Thelen, E., Schoner, G., Scheier, C., and Smith, L.B.(2001). The Dynamics of Embodiment: A Field Theory of Infant Perservative Reaching. [J] Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24: 1-86.
[8] Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in the flesh. The embodied mind and its challenge to western thought[M]. New York: Basic Books. 4.
[9] Thompson, E. (2001). Empathy and consciousness[J]. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, No. 5-7; pp. 1-32.
[10] Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind : Cognitive science and human experience. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 7.
[11] G. Lakoff, M. Johnson. (1999). Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought[M], Basic Books, New York.
[12] 皮亚杰. 发生认识论原理. 北京：商务印书馆，1997年. 16.
[13] Riegler, A. (2002). When is a cognitive system embodied？[J] Cognitive Systems Research Volume:3, Issue:3. 339-348.
[14] Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in the flesh. The embodied mind and its challenge to western thought[M]. New York: Basic Books. 4.
[15] 梅洛－庞蒂. 知觉现象学. 北京：商务印书馆，2001. 106-166.
[16] 梅洛－庞蒂. 知觉现象学. 北京：商务印书馆，2001. 113.
[17] Lorenz, K. (1982). Kant’s doctrine of the a priori in the light of contemporary biology[C]. In H. C. Plotkin (Ed.), Learning , development and culture. 121–143.
[18] 赵艳芳. 认知语言学概论. 上海：上海外于教育出版社，2001. 17.
[19] Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in the flesh. The embodied mind and its challenge to western thought[M]. New York: Basic Books. 3.
[20] Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in the flesh. The embodied mind and its challenge to western thought[M]. New York: Basic Books. 50.
[21] Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in the flesh. The embodied mind and its challenge to western thought[M]. New York: Basic Books. 27.
[22] Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in the flesh. The embodied mind and its challenge to western thought[M]. New York: Basic Books. 36.
[23] Beer, R.D. (2000). Dynamical approaches to cognitive science[J], Trends in Cognitive Sciences Volume:4, Issue:3., 91-99.
[24] Van Gelder, T. (1995) What might cognition be if not computation? [J], Journal of Philosophy, 91, 345-381.
[25] Van Gelder, T. & Port R. (1995) It's about time: An overview of the dynamical approach to cognition[C], Mind as motion: Explorations in the dynamics of cognition. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. 4.
[26] Ashby, R. (1952) Design for a Brain[M]. Chapman-Hall, London.
[27] Eliasmith, C. (1996). The third contender: A critical examination of the dynamicist theory of cognition[J]. Philosophical Psychology. Vol. 9 No. 4. 441-463.
[28] Thompson E. & Varela F. J. (2001). Radical embodiment: neural dynamics and consciousness[J]. TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences Vol.5 No.10. 418-425.
[29] 董奇 陶沙 主编. 动作与心理发展. 北京：北京师范大学出版社，2004. 16.
[30] Thelen, E., and L. B. Smith. (1993). A Dynamics Systems Approach to the Development of Cognition and Action[M]. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[31] 董奇 陶沙 主编. 动作与心理发展. 北京：北京师范大学出版社，2004. 18.
Embodiment of Cognition
Abstract : The notion of embodiment in Cognitive Science is being reinforced due to the limitation and trouble of computational metaphor in cognition since the 80s of last century. Embodiment, situatedness and enaction have merged into each other comprehensively in cognitive science. The embodied cognition holds that cognition is not a transcendental logical competence, but a continuous evolutionary process of situatedness; That the body is at the core of cognition originates from the fact that bodily actions itself reveals the existential intentionality to impulse cognitive development. The internalization theory by Piajet & Vygotsky, the metaphorical mapping theory by Lakoff & Johnson have shed light on how the bodily actions is proceeding toward cognition in higher level. At present, benefitting from the Dynamic System Theory, the research of neural modeling of embodied cognition is developing vigorously. Thus, a more stereographic view of cognition has come into being.
Key words : cognition, situatedness/embeddedness, enactive, embodiment, dynamics.
4 结语
这些研究表明，认知并不单是在脑神经系统中的表征的操作；确切地说，认知最初是在活的身体的界面上进行的，只是到了认知发展的高级阶段，特别是到了符号语义的阶段，认知的内在表征方面才高度发展并成为认知活动的重要领域。在这个阶段，有赖于符号语义特性，认知不再局限于实时的（real-time）的环境，人脑的高度发展的神经系统为离线（off-line）认知准备了一个内在的、想像力的空间，认知者不再非要处于实时的环境中和实际的对象交往，于是在某种程度上，认知成了处理心理表征的过程。这也正是认知主义所聚焦的阶段，但认知主义过于孤立地看待这个阶段而无视它的发展和起源。
具身认知作为一个范式必然有其最初的观念上的变革，它有许多重要的思想先驱，目前逼近它的研究方法更是涉及众多领域。一个对认知更为全景的轮廓正在逐渐形成。
参考文献：
[1] Clark, A. An embodied cognitive science？(1999). Trends in Cognitive Sciences Volume：3, Issue：9, September 1, 345-351.
[2] 莱考夫在和布鲁克曼（John Brockman）的谈话（"Philosophy In The Flesh"：A Talk With George Lakoff）中再直白不过地认为：我们是神经存在，我们的大脑从我们身体其余部份接受它们的输入。我们的身体像什么以及它们如何在世界中发挥作用塑造了我们用以思考的恰当的概念。我们根本无法思考任何东西——除了我们的具身大脑（embodied brains）允许的那些东西。
[3] Ziemke, T. (2001). Disentangling Notions of Embodiment[J]. Workshop on Developmental Embodied Cognition, Edinburgh, UK, July 2001.
[4] The MIT encyclopedia of the cognitive sciences[M] /edited by Robert A. Wilson and Frank C. Keil. (1999). London : MIT Press. 244.
[5] Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience[M]. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 9.
[6] Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience[M]. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 172–173.
[7] Thelen, E., Schoner, G., Scheier, C., and Smith, L.B.(2001). The Dynamics of Embodiment: A Field Theory of Infant Perservative Reaching. [J] Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24: 1-86.
[8] Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in the flesh. The embodied mind and its challenge to western thought[M]. New York: Basic Books. 4.
[9] Thompson, E. (2001). Empathy and consciousness[J]. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, No. 5-7; pp. 1-32.
[10] Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind : Cognitive science and human experience. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 7.
[11] G. Lakoff, M. Johnson. (1999). Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought[M], Basic Books, New York.
[12] 皮亚杰. 发生认识论原理. 北京：商务印书馆，1997年. 16.
[13] Riegler, A. (2002). When is a cognitive system embodied？[J] Cognitive Systems Research Volume:3, Issue:3. 339-348.
[14] Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in the flesh. The embodied mind and its challenge to western thought[M]. New York: Basic Books. 4.
[15] 梅洛－庞蒂. 知觉现象学. 北京：商务印书馆，2001. 106-166.
[16] 梅洛－庞蒂. 知觉现象学. 北京：商务印书馆，2001. 113.
[17] Lorenz, K. (1982). Kant’s doctrine of the a priori in the light of contemporary biology[C]. In H. C. Plotkin (Ed.), Learning , development and culture. 121–143.
[18] 赵艳芳. 认知语言学概论. 上海：上海外于教育出版社，2001. 17.
[19] Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in the flesh. The embodied mind and its challenge to western thought[M]. New York: Basic Books. 3.
[20] Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in the flesh. The embodied mind and its challenge to western thought[M]. New York: Basic Books. 50.
[21] Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in the flesh. The embodied mind and its challenge to western thought[M]. New York: Basic Books. 27.
[22] Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in the flesh. The embodied mind and its challenge to western thought[M]. New York: Basic Books. 36.
[23] Beer, R.D. (2000). Dynamical approaches to cognitive science[J], Trends in Cognitive Sciences Volume:4, Issue:3., 91-99.
[24] Van Gelder, T. (1995) What might cognition be if not computation? [J], Journal of Philosophy, 91, 345-381.
[25] Van Gelder, T. & Port R. (1995) It's about time: An overview of the dynamical approach to cognition[C], Mind as motion: Explorations in the dynamics of cognition. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. 4.
[26] Ashby, R. (1952) Design for a Brain[M]. Chapman-Hall, London.
[27] Eliasmith, C. (1996). The third contender: A critical examination of the dynamicist theory of cognition[J]. Philosophical Psychology. Vol. 9 No. 4. 441-463.
[28] Thompson E. & Varela F. J. (2001). Radical embodiment: neural dynamics and consciousness[J]. TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences Vol.5 No.10. 418-425.
[29] 董奇 陶沙 主编. 动作与心理发展. 北京：北京师范大学出版社，2004. 16.
[30] Thelen, E., and L. B. Smith. (1993). A Dynamics Systems Approach to the Development of Cognition and Action[M]. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[31] 董奇 陶沙 主编. 动作与心理发展. 北京：北京师范大学出版社，2004. 18.
Embodiment of Cognition
Abstract : The notion of embodiment in Cognitive Science is being reinforced due to the limitation and trouble of computational metaphor in cognition since the 80s of last century. Embodiment, situatedness and enaction have merged into each other comprehensively in cognitive science. The embodied cognition holds that cognition is not a transcendental logical competence, but a continuous evolutionary process of situatedness; That the body is at the core of cognition originates from the fact that bodily actions itself reveals the existential intentionality to impulse cognitive development. The internalization theory by Piajet & Vygotsky, the metaphorical mapping theory by Lakoff & Johnson have shed light on how the bodily actions is proceeding toward cognition in higher level. At present, benefitting from the Dynamic System Theory, the research of neural modeling of embodied cognition is developing vigorously. Thus, a more stereographic view of cognition has come into being.
Key words : cognition, situatedness/embeddedness, enactive, embodiment, dynamics.
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