萨特另一重要的对伦理学的理论贡献是他提出了“坏信仰”的问题，如常见的说谎行为，这是伦理学探讨的问题之一。 但是萨特所探讨的是一个不同的问题：不是对他人说假话的问题，而是自我欺骗的问题。萨特对“坏信仰”问题有深入的研究，他揭示了“坏信仰”的本质是为达到个人的某种目的，对他人隐藏自己的真实性。处在“坏信仰”之下的人，将自己置身于虚幻的想象之中，并且把这种幻想当成现实。 虽然他清楚地知道真实的现实是怎样的，但是他不愿意承认和回到现实中来，宁可将自己的身心沉浸于幻想之中。萨特向我们说明，“坏信仰”在社会生活中是非常普遍的现象，它侵害了人的自由。“坏信仰”的存在，使人的自由被异化和受损害。萨特进一步指出，消除“坏信仰”是可能的，人们能通过追求“好信仰”的途径来杜绝“坏信仰”的产生。什么是“好信仰”？就是达到“真”，所谓“真”，就是以真实的、诚实的、可信的面貌对人对事，剥除任何伪装。萨特指出，有两条途径可以通向“真”的境界：一条是清晰地思考，另一条是富有责任心。这两条途径都要求我们待人处世，要坦然地、勇敢地面对现实，不要做“鸵鸟”，逃避现实，要勇于承担各种后果。有人会说，这些方法也许仍然太笼统，但至少向我们提供了一些原则。虽然我们能够抓住一些萨特对如何达到“真”的理解的话语和如何对“坏信仰”进行干预的具体方法，比如永远站在被压迫人民一边，但是总的来说，萨特没有详细阐明怎样运用这些原则。
萨特在伦理学方面有两项重大转变是值得一提的。一是他认识到人是社会的存在物，所以对人的自由的研究必须将其放进一定的社会和历史的环境之中方能进行，由此他将先前认为人是孤独无靠的、脱离社会群体和社会历史条件的观点和研究方法抛到九霄云外去了。当萨特认识到他以前犯的错误后，进而发现当一个社会存在压迫、贫穷和阶级斗争的情况下，人的自由被严重地损害和异化，因此认识到，为了恢复个人自由，被压迫者必须首先联合起来，用阶级的力量去实现社会的自由，个人自由只有在全体被压迫阶级被解放之后才能重新获得。 在第二次世界大战前，萨特提出纠正“坏信仰”的方法是个人的“自我防御”。他相信个人能够通过伦理道德的修身养性达到“真”的境界。然而二战后，他彻底放弃了这种通过所谓“个人灵魂拯救”来实现个人绝对自由的方法，转而接受个人自由的真正实现取决于社会全体人的自由实现的观点。
另一重要转变是他的主观际的理论。萨特早年想象人与人之间的关系在本质上总是冲突的，这是因为一方总要使另一方对象化，即从本体论上分析，每个人在与他人相处时，总会自觉或不自觉地视自己为主体，视对方为客体，反映在人际关系上，就是“他人是地狱”。在萨特眼里，人际关系是一幅冷酷和悲情的画面。然而，当萨特意识到人其实是社会性的存在物之后，他在人际关系中看到了互惠。之所以得出这个结论，是运用了一种新的思维方法，即把处在社会团体中的每个人都看成是“第三方”。在这种方法论指导下，每个人都发现自己是与他人相同的“同类”：既能是主体，又能是客体，还能是主体、客体之外的第三方。这是因为，作为第三方，他看其他人可以是主体也可以是客体。这样，人与人之间就没有区别，是平等的，没有人只是主子不是奴隶，也没有人只是奴隶不是主子。他由此得出结论，每个人在维护个人自由之外，都必须同时承认他人的自由。萨特在他的著名论著《辩证理性批判》中，深入地研究了团体自由、阶级自由和国家自由的问题。他对伦理学中的共同自由研究的成果是：个人自由必须植根于社会全体人自由的土壤之中才能根深叶茂。只有当社会共同自由提升到较高水平，个人自由才能随之得到升华。但是他的研究也有消极的成果。 萨特同时又认为，似乎共同自由发展的程度越高，对个人自由的限制也越多，就是说，共同自由的提升，会导致个人自由的下降。所以，一方面，离开共同自由，个人自由将无法生存；另一方面，从某种意义上说，个人自由与共同自由相矛盾、相抵牾。这是晚年萨特面临的理论上的困境。萨特一方面仍然不放弃早期的个人主义自由观，另方面他意识到共同自由的社会自由与个人自由同等重要。他必须找到一条整合这两种不同的自由的方法，信捷职称论文写作发表网，然而萨特似乎没有能够圆满地解开这道难题。这就是为什么他在有生之年踌躇未完成和发表它的伦理学著作的原因。
我们在遗憾萨特没有写出他的伦理学著作之余，也要想想萨特说过的话：著作的未完成，是留给读者更广阔的空间去思考作者会怎样写下去或会写出什么来，这是件好事。就目前萨特伦理学的研究状况，根据他完成的著作中所表述过的观点去尝试构建萨特的伦理学，是我们肩负的使命。
Is There a Sartrean Ethics?
It is a fact that Sartre did not publish his work of ethics, which he made an announcement at the very end of his philosophical work Being and Nothingness. It is also a fact, however, Sartre had prepared a pile of notebooks for this ethics. Combining these two facts together, what conclusion should we make? Sartre, in the final analysis, is there his unique and creative ethical theory?
There have been many heated debates on this question among commentators and critics of Sartre’s works throughout the world. Neither an ethics nor even a draft or an outline of such an ethics appeared in print during his lifetime. Hence much of these debates focused on questions such as: Is a Sartrean ethics possible, assuming he had time to write it? Is it possible to formulate his ethics from the works he has left us? Some scholars have maintained that such a project was inherently impossible because of internal difficulties within Sartre’s philosophy. They have claimed that the ontological positions of Being and Nothingness undermine its possibility. Others have held that a Sartrean ethics is possible, but only if one abandons his earlier position and bases this ethics on his later works. Still others have indicated the general outlines of an ethics that are discernible in Sartre’s works, arguing that these can be filled in in detail. A final position is that even though Sartre does have many interesting discussions, essays, and notes that relate to ethics, any overall synthesis is lacking and in the final analysis, unattainable.
The above different opining can be reduced to two questions: First, is Sartre’s ethics, which we believe there is one, based on his ontology set forth in Being and Nothingness? If it is, his earlier ontological views maintain that human beings are absolutely free in nature. It would contradicts his later ethical view that human beings are not absolutely free, for his freedom is restricted by the society. The crucial point here is that whether Sartre had been kept or abandoned his earlier ontology in his later life. If Sartre had maintained his earlier ontology till the end of his life, his neo-ethics would not have possibly come into being. Otherwise, we have to find a new ontology for the foundation of this neo-ethics. Secondly, Are Sartre’s ethical points, supposedly there are, can be formed a sketch of Sartrean ethics, from all the literatures of Sartre? Or, even through Sartre did have some ethical points of view, they are mere bits and pieces. In general a systematic ethics is not imaginable and formable.
Many of his critics have held that his early ontology as
