萨特有没有伦理学？(4)
作者：佚名； 更新时间：2014-12-05
developed in Being and Nothingness prevented him from proposing a viable ethics that it is only by repudiating this ontology and embracing another that he could find a proper foundation for morality. Since Sartre does not have another ontological work, this opinion leads to the conclusion that Sartre’s ethics is impossible. Mary Warnock, Walter Odajnyk, and Wilfrid Desan are representatives of this position. However, many others have disagreed with such a view. Thomas C. Anderson declares that those critics who deny Sartre’s ontology are “rooted in misunderstandings of Sartre’s ontology.” He believes that “once the ontology is understood correctly, many, though not all, of these difficulties can be resolved…. It is more accurate to say that on balance Sartre’s early ontology is not so much an obstacle to the development of his ethics as it is its very foundation.” Anderson concedes that it is true that Sartre modified his early ontology in a number of areas in the thirty years after the publication of Being and Nothingness. However, he has not given any indication that “his moral positions have changed in essentials over that period.” The ethical theory, which was set forth primarily in works written in the 1940s, “remains for most part founded on the early ontology.”[1]
Thomas W. Busch reports that in the film Sartre by Himself, Michel Contat asked Sartre if he ever looked back upon the approximately thirty volumes of his works in order to seize what unifying thread there is throughout them. Sartre replied that there was one even though he had never tried to look for it. “Philosophy” would be the only unity there among all the different books. Busch concludes: “In terms of philosophy it would appear that for Sartre freedom would be the obvious unifying concept.”[2] Although on that subject Sartre admitted that he had made considerable changes, his remarks prove that he still regarded his early theory as a part of the whole unifying thread that runs through his later works. Busch, like Anderson, also claims that Sartre’s early philosophy has often been misinterpreted: “Sartre’s philosophy has been, from the beginning, much misunderstood. Forth-five years after its publication Being and Nothingness is still misread.”[3]
David Detmer also maintains that Sartre’s early thought has been, and still is, interpreted with many errors. He firmly holds “that a Sartrean ethical theory can be found.” Although the task is difficult, since “it becomes necessary to reconstruct Sartre’s theory from partial discussions which are scattered throughout his writing.” [4]Other scholars of Sartre, such as Linda A. Bell and James F. Sheridan have also published books that defend Sartre’s early philosophical works.
My own research tells me that Sartre’s early view of freedom was modified in many ways in his later life. For example, he recognized that one’s freedom was related to the exterior world and history, which set them over against this freedom. During the war, he experienced that the obligation to go fight the Nazis and take part in a life and death struggle was something imposed upon him that he had not truly and freely desired nor chosen. In other words, he admitted that there were many circumstances in which one was not free. But it is wrong to think that Sartre had abandoned his early idea of individual freedom from then on. On the contrary, he still insisted in some way on the view that an individual is always free. He clearly stated in his interview with Simone de Beauvoir: “I never abandoned the idea of freedom. On the contrary, every time I acted I felt free.” [5]Thus, on the one hand, he acknowledged that there were some limitations on an individual’s freedom. On the other hand, he still retained the idea that one is always free to choose, even to remain a prisoner or to die. He says, “If tomorrow some threat or other menaces my freedom, death is a way of preserving it.” [6]
Obviously there are some contradictions to be found in Sartre’s different remarks, which reflect a conflict in his thoughts. However, neither did Sartre ever completely repudiate or abandon his early philosophical work, Being and Nothingness. He did criticize the view presented in this work after his radical conversion following World War II. Nevertheless, he made the following comment in comparing Being and Nothingness and his later work, the Critique of Dialectical Reason, in his later years. In his interview with Beauvoir, she asked if he thought the Critique was better than Being and Nothingness. He replied: “I think that’s true, but I shouldn’t say so very willingly because in a way my earlier books are marked by the gratification I had when I was writing them. It’s very hard for me really to think of the Critique of Dialectical Reason as superior to Being and Nothingness.” Why? Because “in a way the past is more important than the future; it brings us something.”[7] Here Sartre provides us a hint that he thought that his early philosophical works, especially Being and Nothingness, are not an obstacle for developing his ethics at all.
Is it a logical argument that if Sartre did not abandon his earlier ontology, there would not have been Sartean ethics? Not really. I admit that because Sartre was not able to find a satisfactory way to reconcile his individual absolute freedom with group freedom and social liberty, he hesitated to bring about his work of ethics in his lifetime. But obviously, from many of his writings, we can see his thinking on this issue and his attempt to solve the problem. We can go after his thoughts, study what he had achieved to retrieve an ethics as his one in the middle way.
Towards the second question, my answer is both “yes” and “no”. The reason I give a positive answer is that it is an undeniable fact that Sartre handed down a considerable quantity of writing on ethics. The War Diaries (1939-1940), Being and Nothingness (1943), Anti-Semite and Jew (1946), “Existentialism is a Humanism”(1946), “Materialism and Revolution” (1946), Notebooks for an Ethics (1947-1948), Search for a Method (1954), Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960), and “Notes on Ethics” (1964-1965) are representative examples. These works contain rich and detailed discussions of topics having to do with ethics, such as individual freedom, personal freedom and social liberty, freedom and value, life and choice, choice and responsibility, authenticity and bad faith, the importance of actions to ethics, force and violence, to be in-itself-for-itself, etc. Confronted with so many valuable materials, we cannot simply assert that Sartre’s ethics is impossible.
Although Sartre failed to finish and publish a systematic work of ethics, and he did not even offer an outline of his ethics during his lifetime, his notebooks scattered in his works, essays, notebooks, interviews, diaries, novels, drama, and biographies, which relate to his ideas regarding ethics. Gather them, study them, and seek to find an internal logic, from which consider the possibilities of a systematic ethics of Sartre. This method was highly recommend
Thomas W. Busch reports that in the film Sartre by Himself, Michel Contat asked Sartre if he ever looked back upon the approximately thirty volumes of his works in order to seize what unifying thread there is throughout them. Sartre replied that there was one even though he had never tried to look for it. “Philosophy” would be the only unity there among all the different books. Busch concludes: “In terms of philosophy it would appear that for Sartre freedom would be the obvious unifying concept.”[2] Although on that subject Sartre admitted that he had made considerable changes, his remarks prove that he still regarded his early theory as a part of the whole unifying thread that runs through his later works. Busch, like Anderson, also claims that Sartre’s early philosophy has often been misinterpreted: “Sartre’s philosophy has been, from the beginning, much misunderstood. Forth-five years after its publication Being and Nothingness is still misread.”[3]
David Detmer also maintains that Sartre’s early thought has been, and still is, interpreted with many errors. He firmly holds “that a Sartrean ethical theory can be found.” Although the task is difficult, since “it becomes necessary to reconstruct Sartre’s theory from partial discussions which are scattered throughout his writing.” [4]Other scholars of Sartre, such as Linda A. Bell and James F. Sheridan have also published books that defend Sartre’s early philosophical works.
My own research tells me that Sartre’s early view of freedom was modified in many ways in his later life. For example, he recognized that one’s freedom was related to the exterior world and history, which set them over against this freedom. During the war, he experienced that the obligation to go fight the Nazis and take part in a life and death struggle was something imposed upon him that he had not truly and freely desired nor chosen. In other words, he admitted that there were many circumstances in which one was not free. But it is wrong to think that Sartre had abandoned his early idea of individual freedom from then on. On the contrary, he still insisted in some way on the view that an individual is always free. He clearly stated in his interview with Simone de Beauvoir: “I never abandoned the idea of freedom. On the contrary, every time I acted I felt free.” [5]Thus, on the one hand, he acknowledged that there were some limitations on an individual’s freedom. On the other hand, he still retained the idea that one is always free to choose, even to remain a prisoner or to die. He says, “If tomorrow some threat or other menaces my freedom, death is a way of preserving it.” [6]
Obviously there are some contradictions to be found in Sartre’s different remarks, which reflect a conflict in his thoughts. However, neither did Sartre ever completely repudiate or abandon his early philosophical work, Being and Nothingness. He did criticize the view presented in this work after his radical conversion following World War II. Nevertheless, he made the following comment in comparing Being and Nothingness and his later work, the Critique of Dialectical Reason, in his later years. In his interview with Beauvoir, she asked if he thought the Critique was better than Being and Nothingness. He replied: “I think that’s true, but I shouldn’t say so very willingly because in a way my earlier books are marked by the gratification I had when I was writing them. It’s very hard for me really to think of the Critique of Dialectical Reason as superior to Being and Nothingness.” Why? Because “in a way the past is more important than the future; it brings us something.”[7] Here Sartre provides us a hint that he thought that his early philosophical works, especially Being and Nothingness, are not an obstacle for developing his ethics at all.
Is it a logical argument that if Sartre did not abandon his earlier ontology, there would not have been Sartean ethics? Not really. I admit that because Sartre was not able to find a satisfactory way to reconcile his individual absolute freedom with group freedom and social liberty, he hesitated to bring about his work of ethics in his lifetime. But obviously, from many of his writings, we can see his thinking on this issue and his attempt to solve the problem. We can go after his thoughts, study what he had achieved to retrieve an ethics as his one in the middle way.
Towards the second question, my answer is both “yes” and “no”. The reason I give a positive answer is that it is an undeniable fact that Sartre handed down a considerable quantity of writing on ethics. The War Diaries (1939-1940), Being and Nothingness (1943), Anti-Semite and Jew (1946), “Existentialism is a Humanism”(1946), “Materialism and Revolution” (1946), Notebooks for an Ethics (1947-1948), Search for a Method (1954), Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960), and “Notes on Ethics” (1964-1965) are representative examples. These works contain rich and detailed discussions of topics having to do with ethics, such as individual freedom, personal freedom and social liberty, freedom and value, life and choice, choice and responsibility, authenticity and bad faith, the importance of actions to ethics, force and violence, to be in-itself-for-itself, etc. Confronted with so many valuable materials, we cannot simply assert that Sartre’s ethics is impossible.
Although Sartre failed to finish and publish a systematic work of ethics, and he did not even offer an outline of his ethics during his lifetime, his notebooks scattered in his works, essays, notebooks, interviews, diaries, novels, drama, and biographies, which relate to his ideas regarding ethics. Gather them, study them, and seek to find an internal logic, from which consider the possibilities of a systematic ethics of Sartre. This method was highly recommend
