The likelihood of a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait，not soon but afterone or two decades，may be judged by answers to several questions：1）Will China'stop politicians discount the high cost of using force to assert their claim to Taiwan？（This may be unlikely until after the first decade of the new millennium ，butit more probably could happen after the year 2010.）
2）At an earlier time ，in the near future ，do mutually beneficial termsexist for an interim truce across the strait，allowing a period of political evolutionon both sides that would enable a peaceful full settlement later？
3）Even if mutually rewarding terms for such a truce exist，do the elitesin Taipei and Beijing have structures that can bring them actually to negotiateit？
4）Would Taiwan's defense capabilities at each relevant time be able（or unable）to deter the most likely kind of attack against the island，which could perhapsbegin with marine mines and Beijing's announcement of an economic blockade？
5）Would the United States help defend the island at those times，even ifChina evolves a more open political system and/or offers Taiwan conditions for aunification with autonomy that would be credibly enforceable and stable ？
Leaders of the People's Republic of China （PRC ）have never forsworn use ofthe People's Liberation Army（PLA ）to assert their claim of ownership againstthe Republic of China （ROC ）。This essay will argue，however，that fair termsexist for an interim truce lasting several decades.To give the reader a sense ofthis essay's direction，possible terms of such a truce can be suggested beforethe reasons for them are explored ：The unofficial negotiating agencies of thetwo sides might agree that Taipei forswear declaring independence from China，andBeijing forswear pursuing force against Taiwan，for a long time（such as 50years）。To head off misunderstandings about truce violations，they could note a third party'slist of countries with which each side claims current diplomatic liaisons ，withoutfully legitimating these.The unofficial negotiating "foundations"could reaffirmtheir present commitments to continue talks toward further agreements.This essaywill also argue ，however，that crucial leaders in both Taiwan and China gainshort-term domestic political benefits from cross-straits tensions.So in practice，they are unlikely to negotiate even a temporary truce.Under these circumstances，the United States will probably help to defend Taiwan's democracy as such untileither Beijing also becomes democratic or offers Taipei very credibly enforceableterms under which Taiwan's democracy could be maintained within a unified China.But because of America's broader global interests —and major concrete interestsin the mainland's potential democracy —if Beijing offers Taipei terms for unificationwith practical autonomy that can be credibly enforced by multiple means includingthe island's army ，then America's leaders are likely to consider their commitmentto Taiwan fulfilled.The US premise that China and Taiwan will resolve their disputein peaceful negotiations，however，is increasingly na ？ve.So the US may be drawninto a war whose effect would be to keep Taiwan politically separate from China.That would be a disservice to America's larger democratic and security interests.Exploration of the five questions listed above will show the shape of this situation.1）Will China's Leaders Use Force to Continue their Taiwan Claim？
This first question is easy to answer ，because Beijing's leaders have alreadyused force symbolically to assert this interest several times ，as in 1995and1996when they held military exercises and fired missiles near Taiwan.They oftenavow a national right to take Taiwan with force ，not just symbolically.Further，Beijing politicians predict in public that their influence over world politics willgrow in coming decades.Even though they no doubt exaggerate the rate of increaseof their power，in the long run they are probably right.China is finally "awakening，"as the adage says.The PRC now has an economy more than four times the size ofTaiwan's，expanding haltingly but quickly.It has a population 60times that ofthe island，and a territory more than 260times larger.The growth of China's economicproduct has been faster than of its military power，but China will become relativelystronger in the world during coming decades ，partly because of its economic size.Beijing leaders'proud expectation of this change is a basis for possible PRC patienceabout resolving its territorial claim on Taiwan.It is also the basis of a certaintyin Beijing that Taiwan must some day become part of the Chinese state.The timingand speed of China's future empowerment for specific purposes can be subject todifferent reasonable estimates.Many scholars -including some in both Beijing andTaipei -expect China to remain clearly unable to use force to assert its Taiwanclaim for more than a decade at least.Recent journalism in Taipei cites the date2010as a likely time of crisis in island-mainland relations.By about that time，many researchers of various political viewpoints think China's military shortcomingswill have changed to strength vis-à-vis Taiwan （though not vis-à-vis the UnitedStates）。China's ability to raise the non-military costs to countries aiding Taiwan—even if the PRC's own costs are greater —will also rise.，in Japan or Indonesia）could alter this prospectus somewhat.But by some period after 2010，China willbecome able to assert its Taiwan claim far more effectively than at present.Thiseffectiveness is delayed currently by specific military difficulties the PLA wouldface in winning a conflict it might start ，by US knowledge of the PRC's illiberalism，and by Taiwan's military and economic prowess.The near-certainty of China's future"superpower"status does not mean that the wishes of its leaders will then prevailautomatically.As the US discovered in Somalia a
