erhaps even the small Taiwan IndependenceParty ，which is also an opposition party，if this document is credible ）vetopower over any important agreement with China.The ROC president has thus inadvertentlyassured Beijing hardliners that they can never lose on the Taiwan issue in theirdomestic PRC politics.He has suggested to reformers that they have nothing to gainin Beijing politics thorough espousal of generous policies toward Taiwan.AlthoughLee speaks in favor of current negotiations and eventual reunification，his 1996policy of minority consent to any major island-mainland agreement suggests thatthese talks would not lead to any military armistice，even a temporary one ，muchless a political settlement.This policy of minority consent in Taipei is the mostdocumentable reason why war is eventually probable over Taiwan.The undocumented，secret positions of mainland militarists may well overdetermine that same bellicoseresult.Statist intellectuals in China tend to demonize Lee as a traitor.They areright to say that he disconfirms his own public statements for reunification byhis public promises to Taiwan separatists.They also are right to suggest that mostTaiwanese people are less sure than many Taiwanese politicians about the benefitsof forswearing Chinese identity.But they are wrong to suggest that Lee Teng-huias an individual is responsible for the difficulty in reaching a PRC-ROC accord.Most other politicians on the island either have similar views or have been toofrightened by the intensity of separatist sentiment to talk seriously about thesecurity problem.Chen Shui-bian，who is the most likely DPP candidate for presidentdespite his defeat for re-election as Taipei's mayor，has recently tried not toprovoke the PRC ，but Chen is widely perceived as favoring permanent independence.The ROC Constitution specifies that any presidential candidate with a pluralitywins；so Chen stands some chance of election if KMT factions split.The most likelynext KMT candidate，Vice-President Lien Chan ，was asked in an interview by thisauthor about his "family."Lien proudly noted that one of his paternal ancestorshad come to Taiwan along with the early entrepreneur-warlord Koxinga.He downplayedthe fact that his mother was a mainlander ，admitting this only after it was mentionedto him.Electoral politics deeply affects what all leaders on Taiwan say.They needto persuade voters that they will protect the incomes and freedoms of Taiwan peoplefrom the uncertain future posed by the scary power across the strait.PresbyterianPresident Lee is still remembered for likening himself to "Moses leading his peopleout of Egypt"—a liberation the PLA might prefer to perform.Lee Teng-hui speaksfor unification ，but with such extended delays that he often sounds like a permanentautonomist."There is no need to declare 'independence，'"Lee remarked in 1997.In another 1997speech，Lee said ，"In our pursuit of national unification，weare concerned [that]Taiwan ，the Chinese mainland ，Hong Kong，and Macau mustbe united under the principles of democracy ，freedom，and equitable prosperity."Whether President Lee's gradualism really amounts to separatism （as most PRC elitesand some independence-minded Taiwan elites like to believe，for opposite reasons），he mainly favors slowness.Sociologist Hsiao Hsin-huang rightly says Lee hasa "deferral agenda."As a ROC official spokesman admitted ，the Taiwanese "generalpublic did not understand the real content of the policy 'no haste，be patient.'This will require more public education."In fact ，the island's people are aheadof their leaders.Taiwanese can reasonably ask whether a solution to Taiwan's long-termsecurity problem should depend so exclusively on slow developments elsewhere，acrossthe water.The current ROC policy evades Taiwan's most obvious need ，which islong-term peace.Procedures for dealing with hijackers，issuing visas，handlingfinancial transfers ，and cross-strait investment are all very helpful.But becausethere is no trust between political elites on the two sides ，these amenities areless important than the danger of war that important leaders on each side have interestsin not facing.When statespeople emphasize only economic and pragmatic confidencebuilding，but do not negotiate to get concrete means to maintain that confidence，they are not yet solving their main problem.The KMT Central Policy Council in 1996commissioned a group to write a "draft peace accord"with the PRC.This includeda clause that separatism might be "diffused"（huajie）。Nothing，however，latercame from this initiative.What has caused this arthritis in the capacity of Taiwan'sgovernment to make a mainland policy that will assure the island's security ？
Perhaps democratization is to blame ，but a more specific cause of this paralysisis a mix of past KMT dictatorship with the current principle of representation；memory of Chiang Kai-shek's restraint of Taiwanese politicians still inflames discourseon the island.Coalition dynamics within both major parties make mainstream KMTand DPP leaders unwilling to alienate a minority of strongly autonomist voters infavor of a larger number of less certain voters who would condone unification withthe mainland under some conditions.Taiwan people's knowledge of past PRC state-fosteredviolence（especially the Cultural Revolution）and the continuing fact that manykinds of mainland Chinese are poorly represented in Beijing are further factorsthat disincline most of the islanders from wanting unification any time soon.Veryfew DPP or KMT politicians are willing to moot political arrangements with Beijing，even for distant future times ，except in private.The probability of an all-partyconsensus ，even for a temporary truce with the mainland ，is near zero.I havebeen able to raise the truce proposal directly in conversations with governmentfigures on Taiwan （the Vice-President，the Premier，and the KMT and MAC chairmen—and thanks go to all of them for making t
