nd earlier in Vietnam ，superpowersare not always supremely effective.But Beijing's top politicians think over timethey will become increasingly capable of realizing their wishes in their own neighborhood.If China becomes relatively stronger and if PRC politics pluralizes ，other powerssuch as Japan and the US can be expected to weigh their overall interests in decidingwhether to commit resources to oppose Beijing then.The US will pay these coststo defend Taiwan's liberals irrespective of any increase of PRC strength，but notafter Chinese politics become more representative or the PRC offers Taiwan a dealfor political autonomy within China whose terms can be guaranteed by Taiwan's ownforces.Some on Taiwan hope that Beijing may eventually rescind its assertion thatthe island is Chinese.Taiwan nationalists cite the fact that post-revolutionaryRussians allowed the Soviet empire to break up，although few outside observershad predicted this.But barely half the people in the USSR were Russian.In China，over nine-tenths are ethnically Han —as are Taiwanese（by language ，kinship structure，religion，and other anthropological measures ）。The chance that PRC elites willforget this is extremely low，now that they think their power will increase.Thisprediction that the China's claim will continue does not necessarily presume theCommunist Party will rule in Beijing for a long time.The Party may go on ，orit may be over.But practically all mainland elites -in government or in dissent-agree that Taiwan is Chinese.Very few in the PRC challenge this view.Taiwan'srecent democratization is seen by some mainland conservatives as a threat to theirown status that requires a continuance of Chinese claims to Taiwan.Mainland reformists，however ，may view Taiwan's democratization as important only if the island isChinese.Many in China are keenly envious of Taiwan's economic，political，andcultural successes.Taiwan's TV comedians and torch singers （e.g.，in the pastthe late Theresa Teng Li-ch ün ）were surely worth an aircraft carrier group.But this PRC awareness of Taiwanese wealth and freedom probably undermines the CommunistParty ，more than it persuades mainlanders that Taiwan is not Chinese.State patriotismhas historically come in many forms ，and in China （like Germany，Russia ，andJapan ）nationalism has generally been collectivist and authoritarian.In Taiwan，with its traditions of rough pioneering on an island that was put under rice cultivationby Hans only a few centuries ago without help from the Chinese state，authorityamong local leaders has been more individualistic than in north China especially.The Beijing-centrism of most PRC intellectuals，by contrast，strikes many Taiwaneseas a severe affliction.The Taiwanese people，according to a foreign scholar ，increasingly "detest the bigots from Beijing，who think that being born in theshadow of the Forbidden City gives them the right to boss around Chinese peopleeverywhere."About 1.2billion Chinese，however，do not live in Beijing ，eventhough attitudes in the PRC government scarcely reflect this fact.Popular mainlandviews as surveyed by questionnaires show that ordinary PRC citizens'views of state（guojia）and nation （minzu ）are dividing very slowly.Nationalisms are allcontested ；and Liah Greenfeld shows they change because of "ressentiment，"aprocess by which one group envies what another has.If this drift in China is sluggishwhile PRC military strength rises ，war might win its race with envy.Chinese constructtheir national identity continuously and in many ways.Mainland entrepreneurs ，Southerners ，and just a few of China's dissidents （those who have given up hopesof careers in Beijing ）press for unification with Taiwan less ardently than militarists，Northerners ，and statist intellectuals.Still ，this is mainly a difference ofapproach，a tactical disagreement rather than a strategic policy difference.Manyaspects of this issue about China's possible use of force against Taiwan can berephrased in a question about domestic PRC politics.Will growth-oriented reformistsOR patriotic conservatives dominate in Beijing？This factor seems to vary overtime，and it is likely to set the maximum terms that Beijing will consider forunification.When such terms are sufficiently favorable to peace，they could giveTaiwanese leaders a chance to solve the island's security problem.Alternatively，at a time when Beijing's xenophobic conservatives may be in power ，this factorcould mean blockades，the mining of ports，and other attacks against Taiwan.Thedirect costs of such actions by the PLA may be decreasing ，and the less certainbut high indirect costs may be irrationally discounted by PRC leaders who are ferventpatriots.This variable could be sufficient to bring long-term（25+years ）Chinesesovereignty on Taiwan ，although it would not do so in the short term（c.5+years）。

　　Reformists are currently in charge of PRC practical administration.PresidentJiang Zemin heads a rather uncharismatic group of technocrats ，and Premier ZhuRongji's most public interests are economic.Taiwan raises issues of patriotic identity，however.These leaders are rationalists ，and they may have some tendency to delayunification with Taiwan until they think the process can be cost-effectively engineered.But some authorities in Beijing or their patrons in the PLA could underestimatethe costs of war against Taiwan.Nationalistic zealotry （which among the classiczealots led to deaths at Masada ）is also evident in statements by fervent Taiwanesenationalists.Vilfredo Pareto ，in his work about the circulation of elites，explainswhy a distinction between hardline conservatives and flexible reformers is a hardyperennial of all politics.Lion-vs.-fox politics is not limited to economic andtechnical matters ；it also affects identity.Growth-oriented PRC reformist elites（Southern，local-entrepreneurial，and some technocratic leaders）may come torepresent a greater diversity of their h