hem not solelyin terms of existential choices ，but also in terms of unintended situations thataffect the results of these choices.Just as economic development is likely to diversifymainland politics more than Party conservatives wish，also the island's peoplecould more attentively heed the external context of their decisions about theirnational identity.Most intellectuals willfully downplay evidence that cognitivedetermination is not all-powerful.But ordinary Taiwanese （like ordinary PuertoRicans，in a fascinating comparative case）allow non-normative considerationsto play a partial role in their political identification.The DPP was founded tosupport Taiwan's independence.The center of its green-and-white party flag showsan outline map of Taiwan.When a party spokesman once was asked whether this meantthe DPP was uninterested in China ，he coyly replied that when the KMT governmentrecovered the mainland，his party would put an outline map of China in the middleof its flag.The DPP，for the National Assembly elections of 1991，had a platformfavoring declaration of a Republic of Taiwan.In the island-wide election in 1992，the DPP manifesto became just slightly more abstract，favoring "One China，OneTaiwan."The KMT platform that same year，however，began unambiguously："We insistthat there is only one unified China……"But neither of these themes played flawlesslyon the stump，where most people were sensibly concerned about the mainland threatand actually had pride in being both Chinese and Taiwanese.Electoral competitionin the mid-1990s，in the context of Taiwan's security problem，caused the publicpolicies of the two largest parties to converge.As late as February 1995，a DPPconvention agreed without a formal vote that the party should "continue to advocatethe declaration of a Republic of Taiwan."But Party workers soon suggested thatin order to win more electoral victories，the DPP would have to moderate this position.They called for a revised party platform，asserting instead the "irrefutable factthat Taiwan is an independent country"already.Nobody openly disagrees that "Taiwanpeople will rule Taiwan."The devil is not in that principle.It is perhaps noteven in the details —but in a lack of will among the politicians of both Beijingand Taipei to seek support on more practical grounds than notions of identity andsovereignty.Large surveys of Taiwan's citizens in 1992，1993，and 1996（shortlyafter one of the PLA exercises）asked two questions aiming to separate the ethnic-normativebases of their political identities from pragmatic-situational bases.The questionswere：1）Some people think that if Taiwan after independence could maintain apeaceful relationship with the Chinese Communist government ，then Taiwan shouldbecome an independent country —do you agree？And 2），Some people favor the ideathat if Taiwan and China were to become comparably developed economically ，socially，and politically ，then the two sides of the strait should be united into one country—do you agree？Responses could be cross-tabulated.An increasing minority （one-tenthin 1992，one-fifth in 1996）both opposed unification even after future PRC politicalchange and favored Taiwan's independence if the island could avoid war with themainland.A sharply decreasing portion of the respondents （41percent in 1992，but 17percent in 1996）both favored unification after PRC political change andopposed Taiwan independence even if the island could remain safe.An increasinglylarge plurality （27percent in 1992，39percent in 1996）had a totally pragmaticnational identity ，favoring Chinese reunification after cross-strait disparitieswere lessened ，but also favoring Taiwan independence if this could be safe.Thismost popular view in 1996is just part-time-patriotic ，for either China or Taiwan.National existentialists of either type are aghast at it.But why should ordinarypeople support state elites more than themselves？This "unprincipled"view is moresensitive to Taiwan's rich history and current security needs than anything offeredby statespeople on either side of the strait.3）Can Taipei and Beijing LeadersActually Negotiate a Truce？

　　The cautious centrism of Taiwan's electorate caused Taipei leaders to moderatetheir stances in the mid-1990s，but it also caused them to press for consensusagainst any decision that would embarrass any of them.In the first direct presidentialelections in 1996，a fuzzy position assured Lee Teng-hui，who is Taiwanese butis also the candidate of the party that can most easily claim to represent stability，a big electoral win.The main effect of China's missile tests near Taiwan ，justbefore the ballot ，may not have been to move voters away from the DPP candidatePeng Ming-min （whose staff had privately and accurately reported long before themissiles that they expected to lose up to one-third of their usual local supportersin the presidential race，where security issues are vital）。China's saber-rattlingexpressed to Taiwan's voters the PRC view that independence could not be attained.But this threat also soon brought KMT and DPP politicians together in a promiseto each other that，in effect，they would reach no serious agreement with Beijing.In December ，1996，President Lee called leaders from Taiwan's various partiesto a "National Development Conference on Cross-Strait Relations."The consensusdocument from this conference stipulated that "The [KMT]government should strengthenthe mechanisms by which opposition political parties……can fully participate inmajor policy decisions regarding relations with the Chinese mainland."This promiseby the KMT to the DPP almost surely scuttles in advance any kind of truce with themainland，even on the uncertain premise that Beijing would agree to terms thatwould benefit the interests of Taiwan's people.Lee has apparently decided a priorithat his ruling party should assure the electorate it will not rule on this politicalidentity issue.He has given the DPP（and p