ncreasing national power ，is the country to which these considerationsare most relevant.The "realist"argument for more democracies concerns future UScost-savings；so it applies most to America's relations with large countries ，and China is very large.Taiwan's smaller size is not a fault of the island's people，but it is a fact whose relevance to US interests in extending democratic peace toChina even Taiwanese can understand.One of the two mammoth ex-Communist countries，Russia，has shown that states once run by Leninist parties can evolve at leasthaltingly in a liberal direction.When this happened，US costs abroad declinedsharply.China has now finished its violent revolution，and its internal politicsare probably moving into a very uneasy era of conflict because of the power derogationthat is taking place.Competitive national elections and freedoms of public speechare not promised anytime soon ，and some "Asian values"of political obediencemight survive even an economic downturn.But the world's largest polity is nonethelessgradually diversifying.As the revolutionary generation dies，technocrats havereplaced them —and a greater variety of politicians is likely to follow.If thePRC becomes a democracy ，the predictable American savings （fewer dollars neededfor security，fewer soldiers killed in future wars ）are large.That is the long-termpolicy significance of the historical fact of democratic peace.So America's democraticinterest in Taiwan is largely that the island can be Chinese.Taiwan's liberal evolutionsuggests that the world's most populous （and perhaps far-future most powerful）nation might develop into a country with which the US can have stable and fruitfulrelations over the long term.Democratic civilizations have never violently clashed.Taipei's policymakers should be aware ，at least ，that many Washington gurusthink this way.Clinton's National Security Advisor ，Samuel Berger，asked ina 1997speech at the Council on Foreign Relations ："Can China successfully makethe next great leap toward a modern economy in the information age without producingthe result of empowering its people ，further decentralizing decision making ，and giving its citizens more choice in their lives？"He answered his own question，"Possible ，but I doubt it."Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has opined that，"China will be a rising force in Asian and world affairs.The history of this centuryteaches us the wisdom of trying to bring such a power into the fold as a responsibleparticipant in the international system ，rather than driving it out into the wildernessof isolation."Nonliberal regimes have difficulty sustaining themselves in countrieswith incomes over $6，000per-capita，if indices of health and education are alsonot too low.This is a strong empirical correlation rather than a normative theory，and it has no exceptions among large countries.China's level of modernization isstill medium-low，even though it has risen smartly in recent decades.China willdemocratize ，if it becomes much richer and thus more powerful.Every country isof course unique in particular ways.But no sizeable country has attained a medium-highlevel of modernization（moderate GNP per capita with extensive literacy and widespreadpublic health ）without becoming a democracy.The only debatable exceptions tothis empirical rule are small states（e.g.，Brunei ），especially city-statesunder potential threat or legal jurisdiction from much larger neighbors （Singaporeor Hong Kong）。There are simply no others on the planet.Anyone who doubts thisshould inspect "Table 1"of any recent year's Human Development Report from theUnited Nations Development Programme，on which （with these small possible exceptionsonly）the first 35states are all unapologetic liberal democracies.Whether thisvery strong correlation between wealth and tolerant pluralism is cosmically rightor wrong，it is a fact.Future progress toward this situation in China may wellprove to be bumpy.But leaders on Taiwan—itself a rich democracy that would beapproximately number 25on the UNDP list if it were in the UN —can depend on thepractical certainty that mainland China will take this state form too when it becomesrich enough.Even though PRC power is rising，many years will pass before it rivalsthat of the US for the purpose of defending a major island against a conventionalinvasion.China's political modernization is likely to take even more time，however，than the development of a decisive PRC military threat.The US certainly shouldnot reduce its military forces in East Asia ，if it hopes to deter war there.Butmilitary power without a clear political goal becomes ineffective.Democracy inTaiwan is worth much more to America if democrats on that island define it as dodemocrats in Hong Kong，i.e.，as Chinese.Acceptable terms for Taiwan（whichwould be different from the ones indefensible Hong Kong had to accept ）may，ofcourse，never emerge from Beijing.But the separate existence of the TRA shouldraise the confidence of Taipei negotiators that a truce with Beijing would be safefor Taiwan at least in the medium term.The US really has a one-China policy，althoughmany intellectuals in both Beijing and Taipei disbelieve this.The US has nevermade a commitment to support Taiwan separatism，because such a policy would ensureeither an eventual war over the island or the eventual abandonment of the Taiwanese.A few voices in Taiwan，pointing to America's "mainland fever"（dalu re ），plausiblysuggest that the US will not protect Taiwan forever.Even if it did ，unificationistTaipei writers say，the island might have a firmer international standing thanit now does if it established a more secure link to China.In fact，American leadersadmire Taiwan's accomplishments a great deal；their enthusiasms are not all pro-Chinese.But the US will act in its long-term interests.For very many of these—rangingfrom North Korea to Iraq，global warming to financial crises —America can benefitfrom