n's military.The foreign shoppinglist has included missiles of many kinds，jet fighters ，helicopters，early warningairplanes ，anti-submarine weapons ，and frigates.With the Cold War ended，defenseindustries in many nations（the US，France ，Singapore，Israel ，and others ）have wanted to make sales to Taiwan for commercial reasons.Taiwan is still receivingdelivery of 150F-16and 60Mirage aircraft ，plus at least 130more warplanesscheduled for production on the island.Despite a great deal of discussion of "theatermissile defense"systems，missiles are by no means the only weapons that the PLAmight try to use against Taiwan.A declared blockade of shipping around the island，perhaps partially enforced by marine mines that are relatively inexpensive，couldbe difficult even for modern forces to deter.PRC pressures against arms sales tothe ROC currently mean that Beijing and Taipei bid against each other.So the pricesrise.Taipei has paid them.This does not assure a successful defense of the island，especially if the PRC underestimates the indirect costs of a prolonged campaignagainst Taiwan's economy.The fact that America will continue its protection ofTaiwan，at least for some years，can be used by Beijing militarists to their advantagein PRC budget politics.Whenever the US has its necessary naval face-offs with China，the island is shielded in the short run —but in the long run ，this syndrome bringsBeijing decisions for more PLA spending on ships，mines，anti-ship cruise missiles，and other equipment that threatens Taiwan's and America's forces.The PRC has amilitary-industrial complex ，and it acts in domestic and interstate politics asits counterparts do elsewhere.But the PLA does not yet have the wherewithal forsure success in an attempt to defeat the island's forces.You Ji rightly suggeststhat the PLA's 1995-96military exercises ，whatever they may bode for the farfuture，mean the opposite of war soon："Until the PLA feels confident ，it willbe reluctant to be dragged into war.Militarily ，brinksmanship in essence buystime to secure PLA readiness."China's naval and air forces are slowly increasing，however.Hong Kong newspapers claim that President Jiang has pressed for a planby which the PRC would complete the building of an aircraft carrier.From Russia，信捷职称论文写作发表网，China has arranged to buy ships that carry supersonic cruise missiles ，which mightconceivably damage even large American aircraft carriers.Perhaps China would pursuesuch weapons now even if the island of Taiwan had never risen above the waves.Butnew military technologies ，and the process of acquiring them，sharply reducePLA incentives to encourage a political deal with Taiwan.The target across thestrait is a plausible excuse for military investment.The same coin also has a civilianside：China's increasing weight in world politics gives many other countries lessinterest to resist Beijing on the Taiwan issue.The PRC might commit extensive resourcesto this ，including many that are economic rather than military.Of course ，armedaction by the PRC would be extremely expensive to China in economic terms.It wouldnot be unprecedented，however，because of China's decision to enter the KoreanWar （on a peninsula PRC leaders never claimed as Chinese ，against a US army thenalready fighting there，and in an era when China was relatively much weaker）。Beijing is more likely to use force if the issue is Taiwan independence ，ratherthan a deferral of Taiwan participation in China.So both the threat to Taiwan andthe options for its defense are more political than military.China's options forattack are likewise half economic and long drawn-out.As the ROC Defense MinisterChen Li-an has said ，Beijing before any invasion would probably "blockade Taiwanin order to suffocate its economy."The PLA could rather easily impose a damagingpartial blockade against Taiwan's trade —but then，it could not quickly or easilyinvade the island and win a strategic victory.PRC military options also includea mere announcement of a blockade without much enforcement.This would affect insurancerates at least.This ploy might be combined with marine mines and armed missilestrikes outside Keelung and Kaohsiung harbors ，where unarmed PRC "practice"missileshave already landed.An air battle over the strait is also conceivable，but itwould not assure victory to either side for several weeks.The outcomes of any ofthese options —or a combination of them—would probably take at least a month todetermine.During that period ，the US might resupply Taiwan's forces or participatedirectly.So the slow and therefore uncertain effectiveness of all PLA strategicoptions explains why China has not already adopted any of them.Even PLA generalsmight ，for a while，still entertain some proposals for a truce with Taiwan.Buttwo decades later ，China's array of military options will be greater as its relativetechnological level improves.Perhaps Taiwan's leaders are not actively seekingpolitical solutions to this military danger because they feel sure foreign forceswill protect them forever.5）Under What Conditions will America Help Defend Taiwan？

　　Since Woodrow Wilson's time ，it has been common knowledge that the US tendsideologically to endorse the political self-determination of peoples.Actual USpolicies have very often violated this ideology ，but the norm remains a US ideal.The issues to raise about this basis of US policy are four：First，does such aview misrepresent US internal politics？For better or worse，the China and Taiwanlobbies in America are more evenly matched than ，for example，the Israeli andArab lobbies.The US has not equally supported the empowerment of all nations.Ifthe PRC does not offer Taiwan unification terms under which competitive electionswill continue to choose the island's executive leaders（as Hong Kong elections donot ），or if Taipei makes clear it would accept such terms，Americans will certainlywant to help defend Taiwan's autonomy.But as Taiwanese ，of all