China's cooperation.Future Chinese democracy，and Taiwan's role in creatingor hindering it ，are serious eventual US concerns of particular relevance to thisessay.More immediately ，the US can also benefit from trying to deal with thePRC on a host of other global issues.Mainstream politicians on Taiwan do not stressthese aspects of their island's situation in public.They prefer to gamble that ，within the period when American military support for the island remains relativelyeasy because the PRC is still militarily weak ，the leaders of China will haveat least a temporary proto-liberal Epiphany and offer acceptable terms to Taiwan.This bet might conceivably win.More probably ，because of China's size，growth，and likely pluralization within a nationalist framework ，it might not.The politicianson Taiwan who take this kind of bet （as the erstwhile government of South Vietnamdid ）are risking a great deal on behalf of their people.Americans prefer to supportallies who have viable long-term policies of their own.The most negotiable suchpolicy might be an ARATS-SEF truce.Americans can show，to leaders on each sideof the strait ，that likely alternatives to a truce are more risky than acceptanceof a truce.One risk for Taipei is eventual invasion—and another ，oddly，isthe effect on US policy of conceivable democratization in China.Taiwan autonomistsdo not have a credible medium-term security policy for their island ，and a trucewould give them one.A risk for Beijing is that recurrent threats of force spurseparatist politics ，and the military technologies that a desperate Taipei coulddevelop are fast becoming cheaper ，both economically and politically.Beijing'sleaders could realize that China's relative power after half a century will almostsurely prejudge the unification issue in their favor—with or without an armistice—so the only real question they face is whether they want a war.Taipei's leaderscould realize that an eventual confederated China ，with democracy at least onTaiwan，would be a better prospect than a conflict taking place on their islandafter a decade or two.Peace would serve many other countries too ，including Japanand the Philippines ，and most notably the US.Conclusion：War is Avoidable butLikely Both the Beijing and Taipei regimes are obstructing chances for peace inthe Taiwan strait.Beijing is doing so because its political system is not yet constructedin a manner to inspire any confidence in Taiwan about the fulfillment of PRC termsfor unity ，to the extent these have been specified.In particular ，the kindsof Chinese on the mainland who are most like the Taiwanese（Southerners ，entrepreneurs，and civilians ）are underrepresented in high PRC positions of power，relativeto people who are more alien to Taiwan（Northerners ，bureaucrats，and soldiers）。Taipei politicians also obstruct peace，and fail their own citizens，by inaccuratelysuggesting that the island will be able to defend its autonomy forever.The UnitedStates unintentionally supports this war process.Most Americans are blissfullyunaware of this ，because Washington's policies concerning the cross-strait issuesince the early 1970s have fostered peace and wealth.Bureaucratic optimists inWashington are easily taken in by disingenuous statements from Taipei and Beijingsuggesting more interest in peace than the domestic politics in either of thosecapitals is likely to sustain.So the US thus far has felt no need to clarify theconditions of its defense aid to Taiwan.American statespeople should make clearthat they will help preserve Taiwan's liberalism as a precursor of specificallyChinese democracy ，as well as as an assertion of US general military prowess onbehalf of liberals.Beijing will object this is imperialism （a stance that wouldbe more convincing if Beijing did not also have an empire ）。Taipei will objectit is perfidious（a stance that would be more convincing if the history of US defenselinks to the ROC had nothing to do with Chiang Kai-shek as a Chinese）。Americanleaders should clarify in public that they will not defend Taipei from being politicallyconnected to Beijing，as soon as Beijing makes clear that its promises of practicalautonomy for Taiwanese can be backed by credible long-term guarantees of enforcementcontrolled for a long time on the island，not just by words from the mainland.But until the U.S.president sees that Taiwan's liberal system is safe（either becauseChina democratizes or has a credibly enforceable deal for Taiwan's system ），he/sheshould be absolutely clear—not "strategically ambiguous"—that an authoritarianattack on Taiwan will be deterred.At present ，there is scant prospect that eitherTaipei or Beijing will do enough to prevent the likelihood of war between them.Washington will probably be drawn into such a conflict，even though its aims insuch an effort would remain ambiguous.The US could predictably win the battles ，but not the sequels.The current trend toward this conflict is beneficial in theshort term to hardline politicians in Beijing and Taipei（and perhaps to militaryspenders in Washington also ）。If this trend is not counterveiled within the nextfew years ，the later result will be costly for all parties.