ned，repressed，or exiled.Such a date wouldalso suggest（though not explicitly ensure）a definite remote occasion when somekind of unification would be probable ，because of China's likely global strengthat that time.Actually，this will be a fact to affect both the island and the mainlandthen—with or without a truce.Beijing's undertaking in this proposal would be nomore than President Jiang Zemin's motto that "Chinese do not attack Chinese"—exceptthat it would be uttered in this case by ARATS in assurance to SEF as a Taiwan representative，not just to a mainland audience.Peace is ，however，against the interests ofhardliners in Beijing who insist in a surreal fashion （despite the evidence oftheir eyes）that Taiwan has no proper government.Among the PRC elite，symbolicinterests concerning Taiwan have often tended to overwhelm concrete interests.WhenGeorge Bush announced a major sale of F-16aircraft to Taiwan （while on the campaigntrail in Texas，where these planes are made），the PRC reaction was surprisinglylow-key even though China's concrete interests in Taiwan were set back by Bush'saction.But when Lee Teng-hui received a tourist visa to visit his alma mater ata hard-to-reach city in upstate New York，the PRC cancelled the American visitof State Councillor Li Guixian，recalled the Chinese air force commander and hisdelegation halfway through their major tour of the US ，postponed indefinitelya meeting of Chinese and American legal experts ，and summoned US Ambassador StapletonRoy to the Foreign Ministry in Beijing to lodge a strong protest，demanding a reversalof the visa decision and warning that US-PRC relations were endangered at all levels.The F-16s were a concrete threat—and their military effectiveness delays China'sTaiwan claim even though Bush suggested otherwise.But the symbolism of the touristvisa brought a much greater PRC reaction.Lee's trip was not a pragmatic move forTaiwan，although the warplane purchase surely was.Taipei's undertaking in thistruce is no more than the assurances against any open declaration of Taiwan independencethat both KMT and DPP politicians have often expressed to security-conscious Taiwanvoters—except that in this case it would be uttered to ARATS as a mainland representative.Peace is nonetheless opposed in Taipei by two kinds of symbolists ：a small minoritywho insist that Taiwanese must never consider the option of concurrently being Chinese，and very many who irrationally overestimate the value of continued ROC demands fordiplomatic "breathing space ，"even though this effort has now become totally irrelevantto Taiwan's security.Taiwan on legal grounds qualifies to be a state under a Viennaconvention—but this is irrelevant to the fact that most countries for political，non-legal ，and amoral reasons （especially China's size ）recognize the PRC.Taipei's truly pragmatic diplomacy is with Washington and Beijing ，not with Tegucigalpaand Ouagadougou.Taiwan will not be saved by Chad （which has recognized the ROC）。Taiwan is not greatly threatened by the Cook Islands（which has recognized the PRCdespite much weeping and gnashing of teeth in Taipei）。Taiwan's mainstream politicians，both KMT and DPP，talk mainly about shadows of sovereign autonomy rather than concreteguarantees of practical autonomy.Since the contradiction between these will probablylast longer than it takes for the PRC to gain in economic and military strength ，these politicians misrepresent the people of their island ，who in surveys wantno war，a multiple identity，and guarantees of future freedom.Both ROC and PRCleaders have on several occasions suggested conditions for peaceful unification ，of which the most interesting from Beijing were published early in the 1980s.Thefirst of these rather vague proposals came in a 1981statement by PLA Gen.Ye Jianying.Ye's "nine points"provided that Taiwan could maintain its army after unification.Ye mentioned no particular reason for this separate army.But the adequate availabilityof Taiwan-controlled means on the island，to enforce any other agreed points ，would certainly increase Taiwan's incentive to accept other aspects of a negotiatedpackage.Actually ，Taipei does not need Beijing's permission for an army on theisland，since it already has one there.But Taipei could well use recognition fromBeijing of the existence of its military，which is a crucial basis for Taiwan'sparticipation in cross-straits talks on any other topic.If a military truce cannotbe negotiated ，no other agreement will be regarded on Taiwan as long-lasting.Deng Xiaoping in 1983suggested "six points"for this negotiation.As he grew older，Deng said that his eyes would not close until Taiwan was unified with China.Finally，they closed anyway.Before Deng's death ，President Jiang Zemin in 1995announcedanother list of "eight points."These precluded Taiwan independence or "two Chinas，"although recent clarifications from Beijing have hesitantly suggested that the"one China"might be something like a happy Buddha of the future，not necessarilyidentical with the present PRC.（Hardliners，who make most statements from Beijingabout "one China，"identify it with the PRC.Quite inconsistently，however，otherPRC statements have probed Taiwan's possible acceptance of the view that the "oneChina"might be a future one—and have received not much response from Taiwan forlocal political reasons.）

　　President Jiang has said he would negotiate with "Taipei authorities on anytopic of their concern"and suggested "consultation on an equal basis soon."Jiangsaid that "Chinese do not attack Chinese"and that only separatists and foreignersshould be attacked.Taiwan's "autonomy"within China was promised ，although inan overture for peaceful unification with Taiwan that word would have to mean somethingnotably different than it does，for example，in Hong Kong.More important ，becausethe PRC is now relatively stronger than it was in Ye's time ，were Jiang's undertakingsthat Taiwan cou