ime for this in their busy schedules ）。But there was no clear response.Even a prominent and ardently autonomist DPP senatordid not fully reject the truce idea ，perhaps because it does not absolutely forsweara possibility of Taiwan independence after fifty years.But he doubted（perhapsrightly ）that the mainland would agree to it.Taiwan autonomists "hope againsthope"that China after half a century will not be much stronger in the world thanat present.But they suspect otherwise，and they know this presents a securityproblem.All the KMT respondents were plainly more afraid of the DPP than of thePLA.Several opined that even an agreement with the mainland not to take actions（as in this proposed truce ），although that would constitutionally require nonew ROC legislation ，would still have to pass Taiwan's Legislative Yuan.The 1996inter-party consensus document apparently trumps the ROC constitution.Such a norm，so long as it is adhered to ，ties the hands of Taipei's negotiators so tightlythat no real accord with the mainland is conceivable.Beijing will minimally demandat least the possibility of a Chinese future for Taiwan ，and Taipei's minorityof determined separatists will veto that.Would a serious truce also be a non-starterin Beijing？It has not been possible for this foreigner to make the same interviewsat similar levels in the mainland's less open system.PRC militarists almost surelyoppose a truce because their budgets and political influence would be lessened bypeace.For Beijing hardliners ，the Taiwan issue provides hardy perennial support.Some leaders stress that Taiwan's "unreasonable"delay in negotiating unificationwill justify using force（although part of this delay probably derives from thetime necessary to improve backward elements of China's military technology）。IfBeijing's main interest is to make room to pressure Taiwan，rather than to maximizethe chance of peaceful unification with Taiwanese whom mainlanders regard as Chinesetoo ，then Beijing will reject a truce.Do the leaders there prefer Leninist centralism，or do they prefer unification with people who at some point might willingly be Chinese？They have been ambiguous about this.Nothing here should be read to imply that onlythe Taipei elites are responsible for the likelihood of war in the strait.If awar begins，it will surely come from the PRC side.Missile tests have already gesturedas much ，more than once ，at a low level of violence whose importance is onlysymbolic.This syndrome is likely to continue ，and it could escalate.Reiterationsof rage often occur in identity wars，as is shown by other tribal conflicts（Israel/Palestineand Serbia/Kossovo are among the many examples）。The mere availability of rationallybalanced solutions to such feuds does not end them.They stop only when ，withineach camp simultaneously，softliners prevail over hardliners who benefit from thecontinuing tensions.Potential accommodationists probably exist in both camps（the president or premier of the PRC and any of the four top KMT politicians mightconceivably be among them ）。But they have thus far done nothing in public tohelp each other across the strait.Conditions for a truce exist ，but it probablywill not be achieved by Taipei and Beijing because some leaders in both capitalsbenefit from prolonging cross-strait friction.Before leaving this topic，it isnecessary for the sake of comprehensiveness to mention six exogenous factors thatcould affect the chances of success in a SEF-ARATS negotiation.For lack of spacehere，these can only be listed in the form of very short questions.First，willa potentially truce-seeking Beijing reformist leadership happen to emerge at thesame time as a potentially Chinese Taipei regime，given the separate courses ofpolitics in those two capitals？Second ，will Korea's unification process be smoothenough to make fair terms for China's seem credible （even though both Beijing andTaipei deny any similarity between these cases）？Third，will Japan exercise itsability to build a much stronger armed force？Fourth ，will China's relationswith Indonesia or other Southeast Asian nations affect the PRC-ROC dispute（as conflictsover miniscule reefs in the South China Sea have already been used to rationalizea PLA navy build-up that is actually more important for the much larger island ofTaiwan）？Fifth，will increased anti-Han separatist politics in Xinjiang，Ningxia，Inner Mongolia or Tibet create more fears in Beijing about China's potential fragmentation？Sixth ，might Beijing later react to dissent in Hong Kong in ways that affect theevolution of Beijing-Taipei relations ？None of these six exogenous issues —andnot even the Asian financial crisis —is likely to affect war or peace over Taiwanas much as the two more important political factors mentioned above ：hardlinersor reformists in Beijing，and national existentialists or moderates in Taipei.Of course ，the military balance and its future changes will also affect deterrenceor war in the strait.4）Can Taiwan's Army Defend the Island？

　　Taiwan's current military strength probably assures the ROC's autonomy for afew years into the future.Further additions to Taiwan's defenses might extend thatperiod—and would allow more time in which political changes might allow truce termsbetween Taipei and Beijing.But the military-economic balance will almost certainlytip in the PRC's favor after a decade or two.Barring a totally unexpected changein defensive technology that would raise its effectiveness for all modern armies，this advantage for Beijing is likely to become decisive in the long run.Taipeihas been unable to produce all the equipment it needs for effective defense ，andthere is no prospect this situation will change.Foreign weapons procurement hasbeen vital for Taiwan —and very expensive.One estimate of the budget for thesepurchases abroad in the mid-1990s runs at an annual rate of more than three timesthe total domestic costs of maintaining Taiwa