ld "also retain its armed forces and administer its party，governmentaland military systems by itself"and that Beijing "will not station troops or sendadministrative personnel."The PRC proposal for Taiwan's "system"is unlike the"system"in Hong Kong ，although neither Beijing or Taipei has emphasized this.There seems to be a sufficiently clear understanding in Beijing ，among any leaderswho may not look forward to a war over Taiwan ，that Taipei will not give up itsmilitary soon.Jiang suggested that using force would not be the ideal PRC tacticfor unifying China.Shortly after Jiang's statement ，Taiwan Premier Lien Changave a speech calling for gradual unification as differences in politics and economiclevels between "the two shores"are slowly reduced.Two months later，PresidentLee Teng-hui issued a similar "six point"statement that called for building confidencebetween the two sides by expanding contacts in functional fields and at internationalmeetings.But he apparently did not instruct SEF to test whether Jiang's representativesin ARATS would use their leader's undertakings as the basis for an unofficial truce—and some evidence suggests that Jiang's Taiwan policy was opposed by hardlinersin the PLA，especially Adm.Liu Huaqing and Gen.Zhang Zhen.The grant of a USvisa to Lee brought Beijing-Taipei contacts to a temporary halt.Chinese naval andmissile exercises were the news of the following year.The two leaderships acrossthe strait trust each other not at all，although the "masses"under them are notmutually acrimonious.What identity do most people on Taiwan actually want？Carefulopinion surveys among the mostly nonintellectual and nonpolitician majority on Taiwansuggest that about one-fifth of all people there want independence（either immediatelyor later），but less than one-tenth want independence as soon as possible.Anotherfifth want the status quo now but unification with China later，although very fewwant unification right away.Another fifth want a permanent continuance of Taiwan'scurrent situation ，i.e.，a nationally uncommitted but practical kind of autonomy.The most popular specific option，garnering one-quarter in an early 1997surveyand as much as two-fifths in 1995and 1996and a later 1997survey，is to maintainthe status quo now and to make a definite decision about Chinese or Taiwanese identitylater.The Taiwanese increasingly see themselves as such，even though most of themalso want to defer their eventual decision about political nationality.The truceterms proposed above would serve the will of this largest plurality ，allowingthem to decide without a war but in light of China's growing relative power andafter a term of more confident autonomy than they will have without a truce.Theconcerns of many Taiwanese about unification are explicitly linked to their incomes，whose average is much higher than on the mainland.Military security is inextricablefrom their practical interest in economic security.Business interests on Taiwanhave "moved an unwilling state"toward more accommodation with China.But intellectualsin both Taiwan and the PRC（for opposite reasons）talk mainly about abstract patrioticideals，not daily life.They glorify identity（rentong ）。When intellectual researcherssurvey the ways most Taiwanese actually identify themselves ，they admit theirdistress at the careful reticence of the modal answer.Most on the island are willingto be politically part-time Chinese ，so long as that choice cannot hurt them；but they have also in recent years become more distinctively Taiwanese.Taiwan voters'interests are far less abstruse than educated writers'discourses imply.A Taipeitaxi driver in 1997put his doubts about unification in terms of welfare more thanidentity："We have had the experience of being taken over once by bandits [he meantChiang Kai-shek's army]，and we will not allow it to happen a second time.Whathas the mainland done for us？Nothing.What we have built up here，we have doneby ourselves."When Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party has won some elections，its candidates（like those of the KMT ）have run largely on administrative andanti-corruption issues.But the DPP was originally pro-independence —and the KMThas also been increasingly pro-autonomist.The DPP has no electoral interest eitherin changing its history or in presenting itself as provocative to the mainland.For Taiwanese ，Chinese identity remains a live option if they wish to choose it，not mainly because of their politically ambiguous pre-1895southern Chinese history，but because most Taiwanese saw their daily lives modernize for three decades afterthe mid-1950s under a Chinese regime.The DPP leader Hs üHsin-liang has a son whochose to study at Peking University.Taiwan autonomists seldom deny that their heritage（xuetong ）is Chinese.But unless they are defeated militarily，they will notgive up their current freedoms.A future Taiwan government could conceivably agreeto some form of unification with Beijing，while also declining to throw peacefuladvocates of separatism into jail.The island's politicians often suggest that Taiwanshould above all refuse to forswear the symbols of their state.But sovereigntyis not food to eat.It shelters nobody from the rain.The main external protectorof the ROC is not among the nations that recognize it.If Taipei decided for practicalreasons to compromise symbols of sovereignty at least temporarily —but not to disownits control of an army sufficient to assure that "Taiwan people will rule Taiwan，"as Beijing says —then the island's people would benefit if that meant at leasta long-term peace.The Taiwan Relations Act ，a domestic US law，would be unaffected.The whole issue can be largely reduced to a question about domestic politics，thistime in Taiwan.Will Taiwanese-only OR Chinese-Taiwanese self-identification prevailon the island ？Nobody but Taiwanese can decide whether they will also be Chinese.In practice ，however，it is more useful to phrase the issue facing t