On the mainland ，most people are not eager for a war against Taiwan.On theisland，roughly four-fifths of the people wish to leave the question of Chineseor Taiwanese ultimate sovereignty undecided for a long time.These stances are compatiblewith a temporary truce between Taipei and Beijing ，by which the mainland wouldnot pursue force while the island would not pursue independence during a cooling-offperiod.Their unofficial foundations might agree to note a third party's list ofcurrent diplomatic ties （without legitimating these formally ），so that neitherside could later claim the other was breaking the truce because of old diplomacy.Cross-straits negotiations on all other topics could be more fruitful if a "timeout"were called on both the island's implicit threat of non-Chinese sovereigntyand the mainland's military threat.If a truce were to be negotiated，which agenciescould do that ？For once ，the answer is easy ：Unofficial foundations representingeach side already exist ，and they regularly contact each other（often by fax）。They can do so only because they studiously avoid all questions of sovereignty anddipomatic status.They are the PRC's nominally non-governmental Association forRelations Across the Taiwan Strait（ARATS ），and the ROC's "private"Straits ExchangeFoundation（SEF ）。In bargaining for a temporary truce，as in negotiating thepractical matters with which ARATS and SEF have previously dealt，questions aboutformal titles ，flags，and status have to be postponed.Such a truce would beformally unenforceable in any court —but that would not at all vitiate its politicaland military usefulness.（Several arms limitation treaties of global importanceremain unratified and are legally invalid ，but their texts despite that handicaphave mostly determined what happens in practice.）To strengthen moderates in bothBeijing and Taipei，and to develop a more pragmatic and less symbolic approachto the problem of preventing a war in the foreseeable future，SEF and ARATS mightagree that：The Beijing side would not pursue major military force to assert itsclaim to Taiwan for several decades （e.g.，50years ），and the Taipei side wouldforswear declaring non-Chinese independence on Taiwan during that same period.Thetwo foundations might also note ，without approving，an unofficial neutral party'slist of the diplomatic liaisons their authorities currently claim.They would permitthat this agreement might later be modified by further interim agreements betweenthe two foundations in the course of the ongoing discussions to which they are alreadycommitted.Such a truce would be most easily negotiable if not further detailed.It would also ，however，be less subject to later sabotage by go-for-broke militaristsin China or by go-for-broke separatists on Taiwan if it could include provisionsabout advance notice of military exercises.PRC softliners might want to make clearthat Taiwan autonomists could not alone decide when China had used force，convertinga minor or accidental event into a major cause for Taipei action that Beijing wouldregard as secession.Similarly，the arrangement would be more stable if ARATS andSEF could agree ，at least tacitly ，that Beijing and Taipei would not encroachon each other's present diplomatic links.Thus PRC hardliners could not later claimthat the ROC's current level of diplomacy amounts to a declaration of independencefrom China—just as during the truce，the Taiwan hardliners would be restrictedfrom making such a declaration.It would not be necessary to do more，as regardsthis symbolically sensitive but practically minor sovereignty-related issue ，thanto take note together of a third party's（maybe some neutral academic's ）previouspublication of a simple list of the current diplomatic posts of each side.The twofoundations could decide that ，for the sake of peace and further negotiationsbetween each other，self-restraint against changing this situation would be mutuallybeneficial.In many respects，this truce proposal differs from harder-to-negotiatesettlement plans that have been suggested by Kenneth Lieberthal and by Joseph S.Nye ，Jr.This truce would be agreed by the officially unofficial foundations，not by the governments whose pride in stately symbols still prevents any diplomaticcontact between them.This proposal formally suggests mutual undertakings only fora specified period，an interim truce rather than a final deal.The current cross-straitproblem is that Beijing leaders have not explicitly agreed to a real confederationyet ，and Taipei leaders have not explicitly agreed to irrevocable Chinese unificationyet.This truce would practically —though not explicitly —assure the emergenceafter fifty years of a Chinese confederation retaining full democracy at least onTaiwan；so it would meet each side's main substantive demands，which each side'spoliticians are still too awed by sovereign emblems to serve effectively.The mostcrucial aspect of the truce would be the long-time-future date.From Taipei's viewpoint，its role would be like the 1997expiry of the New Territories lease ，which arbitrarilydelayed Beijing's moment for implementing another claim.The PRC has been througha violent revolution，and the respite would allow more time for Chinese politicsto change.From Beijing's viewpoint ，a far-distant date would also allow timefor Taiwan's warring politicians to gain more distance from the memory of ChiangKai-shek's repression ，which still gives some impetus to ardent separatism amongTaiwanese leaders whom Chiang impriso
